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Motivating Application: Cyber-Physical Systems
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) has tight interaction between
computation and physical processes.
Example: Electronic control units (ECUs) control everything (engine,
brakes, drive-train, etc.) in automotive systems.
An ECU uses some sensors and actuators to control a part of the
physical system through a feedback loop.
ECUs statically tied to a processor cannot share computing power and
are subject to faults.
Prof. Tomohiro Yoneda’s research group at National Institute of
Informatics (Japan) proposed a Network-on-Chip (NoC) approach for
flexible mapping of ECUs onto the available processors.
In this talk: experience report about the verification of different routing
models with CADP.
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Related Work
precomputed route tables: not adaptive, only permanent faults
Glass/Ni algorithm: faults of complete routers rather than single links
GeNoC: formal proofs with ACL2
ANOC/CHP: verified with CADP, but no fault-tolerance
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Network-on-Chip Topology
Two-dimensional mesh
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Properties for Verification
The link-fault tolerant routing algorithm is free of deadlocks.
Given at most one failure link, it is never the case that a router is unable
to route a packet.
Given at most one failure link, a packet never gets dropped when it is the
only one packet in the network.
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Plan of the Presentation
Two-By-Two Mesh Architecture
Principles of the Routing Algorithm
Counter-Clockwise Routing Model
Structural Abstraction to Reduce the State Space
Data-Abstractions to Reduce the State Space
Verification Results
Conclusion
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Principles of the Routing Algorithm
Two-phase routing
1 negative phase: towards south/west
2 positive phase: towards north/east
Illegal turn: switch from the positive
phase back into the negative phase
Tolerance of link faults: divert packets
to take illegal turns
Deadlock avoidance by dropping
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link failure “arb_W_10 -> r_E_00” implies diversion & illegal turn for green packet from r_ip_10 to arb_ip_01
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link failure “arb_W_10 -> r_E_00” implies diversion & illegal turn for green packet from r_ip_10 to arb_ip_01


















to avoid deadlock, drop green packet attempting an illegal turn
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CADP (Construction and Analysis of Distributed Systems)
Toolbox for the design of asynchronous systems
Formal approach rooted in concurrency theory:
process calculi, labeled transition systems, temporal logic
Many verification techniques:
simulation, model- and equivalence checking, compositional and distributed
verification, test-case generation, performance evaluation, rapid prototyping
Convenient languages for
system modeling (LNT),
temporal logic properties (MCL), and
execution of verification scenarios (SVL)
More than 150 published case-studies and 70 third-party tools
For more information: http://cadp.inria.fr
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A Counterclockwise Routing Model
Each PE router only
generates one single-flit
packet destined to the node in
its diagonal direction.
Only the counterclockwise
routing direction is available.
No packet forwarding
computation in the routers.
Packets take the north-west
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LNT Model of the West Arbiter of Node (1,1) — arb_W_11
process arbiter_nack [ca, ra, ar : any] is
loop
var one_flit : Nat in
select
ar; -- Router r_E_01 is ready to accept packet
select
ca(?one_flit); -- Receive packet from r_ip_11
ar(one_flit) -- Send packet to r_E_01
[]
ra(true); -- Ready to accept from r_S_11
ra(?one_flit); -- Receive packet from r_S_11
ar(one_flit) -- Send packet to r_E_01
end select
[]
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LNT Model of the South Router of Node (1,1) — r_S_11
process router_drop_pkt [ar, ra : any] is
loop
var status : Bool , one_flit : Nat in
ar; -- Ready to accept packet from arb_N_10
ar(?one_flit); -- Receive packet from arb_N_10
ra(?status); -- Request arb_W_11’s status
if status then
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Verification Results for the Counterclockwise Routing Model
No reduction techniques are required for state space generation.
Deadlock avoidance mechanism drops packets making an illegal turn.
Expected worst case:
three packets make illegal turns and get dropped;
at least one packet remains cycling in the network.
Reachability analysis finds deadlocks!
Diagnostic sequence (“packet leakage path”):
All four packets get dropped due to deadlock avoidance.
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Reason for Packet Leakage in the West Arbiter of Node (1,1)
process arbiter_nack [ca, ra, ar : any] is
loop
var one_flit : Nat in
select
ar; -- Router r_E_01 is ready to accept packet
select
ca(?one_flit); -- Receive packet from r_ip_11
ar(one_flit) -- Send packet to r_E_01
[]
ra(true); -- Ready to accept from r_S_11
ra(?one_flit); -- Receive packet from r_S_11
ar(one_flit) -- Send packet to r_E_01
end select
[]





arbiter_nack [r_ip_11 , r_S_11 , r_E_01] -- arb_W_11
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Packet Leakage in the West Arbiter of Node (1,1)
Arbiter arb_W_11: nondeterministic choice to send to r_S_11
a positive acknowledgement
a negative acknowledgement
Negative acknowledgment always possible, regardless of potential
deadlocks:
a packet leakage path exists!
Possible solution: prioritized choice: sending a positive acknowledgement with
higher priority
Drawbacks of the priority-based approach:
LNT implementation of the priority choice requires additional processes,
leading to possible state explosion.
Pruning the unwanted execution paths from the generated state space
using the priority operator in EXP.OPEN/SVL.
The divergence-sensitive branching bisimulation is not a congruence for
the priority operator.
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Structural Abstraction to Reduce the State Space
State explosion becomes a problem once all components are built for the
two-by-two mesh.
One major reason: interleavings of gate rendezvous between connected
routers and arbiters.
Idea: Merge routers and arbiters of one node into one process,
completely removing rendezvous internal to a node.
Drawbacks of this simplification:
It removes the possibility of
multiple packets passing through
a single node at the same time.
It removes the buffering capacity of
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Example of Deadlock
process n00 [ip_00 , ...] is
loop
var one_flit : Nat in
select
ip_00(?one_flit);















process n01 [ip_01 , ...] is
loop
var one_flit : Nat in
select
ip_01(?one_flit);
















n00_n01, n01_n00, ... -> n00 [...]
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Finding Proper Data Abstractions
The counter-clockwise routing experiment reveals the packet leakage in
certain arbiter’s design.
The experiment with bufferless arbiters shows the necessity of arbiter’s
buffering ability.
Data abstraction is required to keep the state space manageable.
The packet’s content is only checked by routers to precisely determine
the next forwarding direction.
Each router may potentially send a randomly destined packet to any
possible forwarding direction.
Abstract the precise forwarding direction decision with nondeterministic
choice.
This abstraction results in manageable state space.
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Finding Proper Data Abstractions
Constraints:
Fault-tolerance provides alternative route(s) for all packets.
Router’s nondeterministic choice should allow all forwarding directions for a
randomly destined packet.
Illegal turns are never the preferred choice unless all forwarding routes of a
router are illegal.
Routers are classified into three types:
RI2 can make only one illegal turn:
r_S_11 and r_W_11;
RI1 can make one illegal turn
and one legal turn:
r_W_10 and r_S_01;
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Packets Without Data
Extreme abstraction: eliminate the packet entirely, use pure
synchronization
The packet leakage still exists at RI2 (router allowing only illegal turns):
RI2 has two choices for a packet: to drop it or forward it on an illegal turn.
With no packet content, the nondeterministic choice may always take the
illegal turn.
An illegal turn leads to packet drop regardless of deadlock avoidance.
A packet takes an illegal turn only after an unsuccessful attempt to take
route due to a failure on the route.
Stated otherwise: When a packet makes an illegal turn, it must have been
diverted at least once before.
Use a single-bit Boolean variable to model packet data: true iff packet has
been diverted before.
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The LNT Process for RI2
process router_two_illegal [input , out_arb_ip , out1_illegal ,
out2_illegal , drop : any] is





if one_flit == true then
-- priority to out1_illegal
out1_illegal(?arb_status);
if arb_status == true then out1_illegal(one_flit)
else
out2_illegal(?arb_status);
if arb_status == true then out2_illegal(one_flit)
else drop -- both illegal turns impossible
end if
end if
else stop end if
end select
end loop end var
end process
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The LNT Process for The Arbiter Corresponding to RI2
process arbiter_nack_2 [in_ip_router , in1_illegal ,
in2_illegal , arb_out : any] is
var one_flit : Bool in
loop select
in_ip_router(true); in_ip_router(?one_flit);




end select end loop -- L1
[] in1_illegal(true); in1_illegal(?one_flit);




end select end loop -- L2
[] in2_illegal(true); in2_illegal(?one_flit);




end select end loop -- L3
end select end loop
end var end process -- arbiter_nack_2
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Compositional LTS generation for Two-by-Two NoCs
Nine scenarios: without failed link plus all possible single link failures
SVL scripts to automate compositional LTS generation and reduction
No deadlocks found in any of the generated LTSs
All but route-failure and drop gates hidden:
No route failures: no corresponding label in the LTSs
No packet drop for a single packet in the NoC
Packet drop possible whenever more than one packet in the NoC
Failure Interm. LTS Size Final LTS Performance Labels
Link States Transitions St. Tr. RAM Time
none 6,295,773 83,386,208 1 1 32,945 5,976 i
01 → 00 20,340 193,726 41 224 111 83 i, drop_Sr_11, drop_Wr_11
01 → 11 1,369,068 18,221,153 1 3 4,039 499 i, drop_Sr_01, drop_Sr_11
00 → 10 6,560 50,688 21 104 111 80 i, drop_Sr_11, drop_Wr_11
00 → 01 6,560 50,688 21 104 111 81 i, drop_Wr_11, drop_Sr_11
10 → 11 122,724 1,269,981 1 3 111 89 i, drop_Wr_10, drop_Wr_11
10 → 00 20,340 193,726 41 224 111 80 i, drop_Wr_11, drop_Sr_11
11 → 01 367,200 4,172,652 1 3 111 106 i, drop_Sr_11, drop_Wr_11
11 → 10 367,200 4,172,652 1 3 111 105 i, drop_Sr_11, drop_Wr_11
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Conclusion & Future Work
Formal Analysis facilitates detection of design flaws
(packet leakage)
Gain deeper understanding of the routing algorithm
(necessary buffering capacity of the arbiters)
Extension of the LNT model to larger networks (three-by-three,
four-by-four, ...), where nodes differ in the number of connections
Study packet delivery guarantees
Refine abstractions
Can the discovered symmetries help in fighting the state space
explosion?
Enrich the model to enable performance analysis
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